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Abstract. This paper focuses on what happened to industrial production during and after 
Hungary’s record-breaking hyperinflation of 1945-46 – an angle that has not been covered 
extensively by previous authors. The industries covered are coal, railways, agriculture and 
mining. This paper then explores the relationship between post-World War II production 
and hyperinflation, as well as Hungary’s recovery from hyperinflation and World War II 
relative to other countries. 
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1. Introduction 
o date, there have been 56 recorded hyperinflation episodes in 
history (Hanke & Krus, 2012). Many people have heard anecdotes of 
Germany in the early 1920s, where a loaf of bread cost a barrel full of 
money, or Zimbabwe in 2007-08, where the inflation rate was a “zillion” 
percent. However, few know of the greatest hyperinflation of all time, 
where, at the peak, prices doubled every 15.6 hours and notes were issued 
in denominations of 100 million pengőes and 1 billion pengőes (Hanke & 
Krus, 2012). This hyperinflation episode started in Hungary in August 
1945, and stopped in July 1946, when the worthless Hungarian pengőwas 
replaced with the Hungarian forint. There were efforts during the episode 
to stabilize the currency, most notably with a tax pengő index, where 
conversion rates were adjusted every day to account for rising prices 
(Encyclopedia of Money). The tax pengő (adopengő), however, also ended up 
hyperinflating. Stabilization occurred on August 1, 1946 when the 
Hungarian government issued a new currency—the Hungarian forint. The 
hyperinflation was so extreme that the final conversion rate was 400 
octillion (4 followed by 29 zeros) pengőes for just one forint (Exchange 
Currency).  
This paper focuses on the production side of industries shortly after 
World War II (WWII) and their relationship with hyperinflation. Many 
factors contributed to Hungary’s hyperinflation episode, such as 
astronomically high rates of money printing, decreased production across 
all sectors, high war reparations, destroyed capital, and loss of gold 
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reserves (John Doe Is Taken to the Cleaners). The paper will first go 
through the basic production and price data of the coal and railway 
industries, agriculture, and mining. It will then examine the relationship 
between output and hyperinflation. 
 
2. Basic data 
During WWII, Hungary sided with the Axis powers. Hungarian and 
German forces were defeated by Soviet forces in 1945 (Hoensch, 1996). 
Early in the war, Hungarian troops fought at Stalingrad, suffering many 
deaths. In 1944, Hungary itself became a battleground and suffered major 
consequences from WWII (Grossman & Horv{th, 2000). These included 
loss of population amounting to 400,000 persons—4.34 percent of the 1939 
pre-war population—land, capital, and gold (Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office; National Bank of Hungary, Hungary in Statistical Tables, 1947). 
Statistics and charts below display the effect WWII had on Hungary’s 
economy. Chart 1 displays the losses in various sectors that Hungary 
suffered, calculated as a percentage of its national wealth before the war. 
Chart 2 is another depiction of data that recorded the loss of national 
income after WWII, and the loss each component of national income had. 
These numbers were indexed to pre-war levels of 1938/1939. From these 
charts, it is evident that Hungary’s economy endured heavy losses as a 
result of WWII. All sectors, with the exception of rental dwellings, fell in 
value of at least 40 percent. 
To examine Hungary’s economy more in depth, let us look at some 
macroeconomic variables before and after the war. Chart 3 shows 
Hungary’s GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars. The 
source did not provide data for 1943-1945. 
We can assume that figures were not recorded or reported during this 
time period, or that further digging would need to be done in order to 
discover these numbers. 
 
 
Figure 1. Losses from WWII (% of National Wealth) 
Notes: *Source did not indicate if it included territorial losses, or which territory numbers were 
based on. Source: National Bank of Hungary, Hungary in Statistical Tables,(1947),p. 32. 
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Figure 2. Hungarian National Income, 1945/1946 (as % of 1938/1939) 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Hungary in Statistical Tables,(1947),p. 33. 
Notes: *Source does not specify territory includes or specifics of 1945/1946 calculations. 
 
 
Figure 2. Hungarian GDP per Capita (1990 International Gheart-Khamis dollars) 
Source: Maddison Project (2013). 
 
However, we can see from Chart 3 that GDP per capita decreased 
between 1942 and 1946.GDP per capita then began to slowly rise after the 
war. The next part of the paper will explore this trend through analyzing 
different industries and their production. These industries include coal and 
railway industries, agriculture, and mining/oil. There are, however, other 
sectors in the economy that add to overall GDP. The industriesjust 
mentioned were chosen because of their importance in production post-
WWII and their availability of data. With increased production of different 
sectors after WWII, Hungary’s GDP per capita was able to rise.  
 
3. Coal and railways 
It is important to take a further look into the industries and sectors that 
were affected by the war. We will first examine the coal and rail industries, 
as their decline in production and capital created substantial burdens for 
economic recovery and productivity. In Chart 4, we find coal production 
statistics. The red line shows the pre-war levels of coal production. Within 
two years after WWII coal production recovered to pre-war levels. 
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Additionally, the railway industry was affected by the war; train lines 
and capital associated with the railway industries were destroyed. Tables 
1aand 1b show the damage that the Hungarian railway industry withstood. 
Coal and railways were grouped together here because their decrease in 
production and capital is arguably the most important in terms of economic 
recovery. Without coal, there was little electricity and production across all 
industries was affected. For example, there was limited heat in hospitals. 
Further, the loss of capital associated with railways caused problems 
fortransportation of goods and people for personal travel. All personal 
travel was restricted andrailways were only to be used for factory workers 
and professional needs (Vas & Gonda, 1977).  
 
 
Figure 4. Coal production, 1945-1947 (tonnes) 
Source: Adapted from Siklos (1991), Table M6. His cited source: MNBHK, XX (Oct. - Dec. 
1946), p. 263. GT, 1947, pp. 683-84. 
 
 
Table 1a. Railway Inventory, 1938 versus December 1945 
 Inventory 
(1938)1 
Completely 
Wrecked 
Damaged but 
Repairable 
Fit for 
Operation 
Locomotives     
Steam 1,962 173 154 470 
Electric 59 12 17 7 
    Other 2    
Total 2,023 185 171 477 
Motor rail cars 507 64 188 96 
Motor rail autobuses 40 6 12 4 
Passenger cars and motor rail car trailers 4,574 431 780 705 
Combination baggage cars 1,218 136 125 169 
Mail cars 363 31 26 67 
Freight Cars     
     Box 17,313 1,130 914 1,540 
     Refrigerator 60 100 
     Open 27,913 1,427 1,193 4,064 
     Timber 166 346 
    Tank 166 101 131 298 
    Others 3,757 74 154 1,187 
Total 49,149 2,732 2,618 7,535 
Source: Ecker-Racz, 1 June 1946, p. 34. Information is incomplete.  
Notes: 1Changes between 1938 and 1944 disregarded because present area of Hungary is 
that of 1938. 
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Table 1b: Railway Damage 
 
Restrictions ontransportation stopped goods from being shipped across 
the country. In addition, many bridges around Budapest were destroyed, 
which further impeded transportation of goods (Grossman & Horv{th, 
2000; Vas & Gonda, 1977).   
 
3. Agriculture and livestock 
The year1945 wasa particularly bad one for agriculture. Hungary 
experienced a bad harvest, partly attributable to drought: expected wheat 
production was 3 million tons, while the actual production was only 1 
million tons (Hungary in Statistical Tables, National Bank of Hungary, 1947; 
Vas & Gonda, 1977). The following are statistics for agricultural yields and 
numbers of livestock left after WWII. Charts 5 and 6 paint a grim picture 
ofthe agrarian outlook in 1945 for Hungary. All products, with the 
exception of potatoes and maize, saw increased production in 1946, but 
although yields were rising, they remained well below pre-war levels. 
 
 
Figure 5. Yield of Most Important Agricultural Products in Hungary (% of 1938 Levels) 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Hungary in Statistical Tables (1947), p.5. Notes: *Based on 
the territory of the country as outlined in the Treaty of Trianon. 
 
 
Figure 6. Livestock in Hungary (% of 1938) 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Hungary in Statistical Tables (1947), p.6. Notes: *Based on 
the territory of the country as outlined in the Treaty of Trianon. 
 June 198 
level 
Destroyed or damaged 
during WWII 
Length of railways in kilometers 11,488 4,146 
Switching apparatus 13,784 5,330 
Length of tunnels in meters 3,571 300 
Railroad bridges  537 
Culverts  311 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Hungary in Statistical Tables (1947). 
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With lower yields, and the government introduced a rationing system 
and the diet of Hungarians changed. Simultaneously, prices of agricultural 
products began to increase because of higher price levels and shortages. 
Chart 7 shows monthly log scale data for agricultural prices of wheat, 
barley, and maize for the year of 1946.The axis uses a logarithmic scale 
because prices rose at such an astronomical rate. 
 
 
Figure 7. Log scale, Prices of Wheat, Barle, and Maize (milpengos per quintal) 
 
 
Figure 8. Log Scale Index for Industrial Prices and Agrarian Prices (October 1, 
1945=100) 
Source: Hungarian Central Creditbank, August 1946 
 
Combining both agrarian and industrial sectors, Chart 8 reviews the 
price index for both sectors in the year of 1946. The increase of prices for 
both sectors is dramatic. Further calculations show that the two lines have a 
correlation of 1, showing that the prices for each sector rose proportionally. 
 
4. Mining/Oil 
The last industry this paper will cover is mining. As expected, the 
mining industry was also hit hard by WWII. Chart 9 shows production of 
various minerals for 1938, the second half of 1945, and the first half of 1946 
(the latter two being the periods that Hungary experienced hyperinflation). 
We can see that production of all minerals, with the exception of 
petroleum, decreased after WWII—most notably natural gas, which 
experienced a 99.01 percent reduction. Products of the mining industry 
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were used for heat, energy, and raw materials for other goods. All 
minerals, with the exception of black carbon and petroleum, increased 
production from their 1945 levels in 1946.  
 
 
Figure 9. Mining Production Data (units in 1000q) 
Source: Magyar Gazdasagkutato Intezet, p.8. Notes: *1000q (q mazsa = 100 kilograms, 1000q 
= 100,000 kilograms) 
 
5. Analysis 
Our goal is to try to determine the extent to which production of each 
sector affected hyperinflation and how hyperinflation affected production 
of goods in post-WWII Hungary. Before we can analyze the relationship 
between the two, we will first explore the hyperinflation and cost of living 
indices during the time period. Chart 10 shows the log scale cost of living, 
excluding rent, indexed to 1945. We chose to use indices that excluded rent 
because rent prices are sticky and do not inflate as fast and to the degree 
that other goods do. From this index, the highest calculated monthly rate of 
inflation is 1.97 x 1017 percent. After analyzing each sector and the total cost 
of living, we found that each correlated with the total cost of living at least 
.99999 and “Other Requirements” had a correlation of 1 with the total cost 
of living. It is clear that prices moved together and we cannot place the 
cause of hyperinflation to one sector’s price increases.  
 
 
Figure 10. Cost of Living, Excluding Rent (1945=100) 
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Further looking into hyperinflation, we should explore the amount of 
notes circulating in the economy compared to a price index and the real 
purchasing power of the currency. Charts 10, 11a and 11b illustrate the high 
note circulation, its value indexed to 1938, and its real purchasing power. 
From these three, we can see that as notes kept on circulating, the 
currencybecame worthless. There was too much money in the economy for 
the amount of goods present, making it difficult to purchase goods because 
the currency was being devalued. By the end of the hyperinflation in July 
1946, the addition of new currency barely made a difference to purchasing 
power. 
In post-WWII Hungary, policymakers had two problems to deal with: 
hyperinflation and shortages of goods. Grossman & Horv{th (2000) explore 
the decisions policymakers had to make: either encourage hyperinflation, 
or try to combat it by raising revenue and cutting note circulation 
(Grossman & Horv{th, 2000). Ultimately, they argue that hyperinflation 
was chosen as a way to boost the economy and encourage production 
before the new currency was introduced. 
 
 
Figure 11a. Nominal Note Circulation (Pengoes) 
Source: Hungarian General Creditbank, August 1946, Appendix I. 
 
 
Figure 11b. Real Note Circulation (1938=100) 
Source: Winkle (1947), p.184. 
 
 
Figure 12. Note Circulation and Real Purchasing Power 
Source: Winkle (1947), p. 184. 
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It is important to note that even if policymakers decided to combat 
hyperinflation, it could have been inevitable from the amount of money 
circulating and the severe supply shock. As Grossman & Horv{th (2000) 
explain, increasing the money supply in itself is a demand shock and can 
be thought of as a way to stimulate consumption. When there is high 
inflation, money loses value and thus people are more likely to buy goods. 
However, an increase in the money supply is not useful unless there are 
goods to buy. Thus, the government also needed a way to stimulate 
production. We must now explore hyperinflations effects and 
governmental policy effects on various areas of production. Recall from 
previously that coal, mining, and agricultural production, with a few 
exemptions, all experienced rising levels of output after 1945. 
Whether for economic or political reasons, most industries post WWII in 
Hungary were nationalized and became state enterprises. However, only 
the mining industry and few power plants were nationalized before 
stabilization–that is, before hyperinflation ended (Ecker-Racz, 1954). 
Therefore, during hyperinflation, the government had to work both 
publicly and privately to encourage entrepreneurs, investment, and 
production. In order to tackle agricultural problems, major land reform 
took place. Land reform split up large estates and worked to give lower 
income-classes private land (Stowe, 2011). The government also gave out 
loans in private credit markets at interest rates that were not indexed to the 
cost of living, knowing that the payments would become worthless because 
of inflation, or possibly without the expectation that they would be paid 
back (Grossman & Horv{th, 2000). State enterprises also received grants. 
The newly created Ministry of Reconstruction utilized the labor market for 
infrastructure and harvest purposes. Further, the Hungarian government 
involved banks to provide funds to entrepreneurs. This was done by 
paying banks to transfer money to producers. The central bank’s discount 
rate was 3 percent, and accounting for the inflation that reached over 10,000 
percent, the real interest rates became very negative (Grossman & Horv{th, 
2000). All were seen as a way to boost production. 
Comparing industries, we see that all sectors made decent progress in 
getting back to pre-war levels. Chart 13 displays monthly coal and steel 
production, indexed to 1937-1938 levels. This evidence supports the view 
that the Hungarian government successfully steered hyperinflation in a 
way that could aid production, as claimed by Grossman & Horv{th (2000), 
who report that raw material production and infrastructure recovered 
significantly. 
They cite Fekete, when stating that railroads were at 90 percent, and 
metal and iron industries at 75 percent, of their prewar level by August 
1946 (Grossman & Horv{th, 2000). From Chart 13, we can see that coal 
production steadily increased, while steel production was more sporadic 
and actually did surpass pre-war levels, before coming back down at the 
end of 1947. Chart 14 displays production data for a wider variety of 
industries, although the data is of lesser frequency.  
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Figure 13. Average daily production of coal and steel (1937-1938=100) 
Source: Adapted from Siklos (1989). Notes: *Data unavailable for steel production during 
October 1945 to December 1945 
 
 
Figure 14. Production per year (Log scale) 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Monthly Bulletin, July-August 1947, p.182. Notes: *Chart 
numbers in various physical units 
 
 
Figure 15. Production in 1946/1947 (% of 1938) 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Monthly Bulletin, July-August 1947, p.182. 
 
 
Figure 16. Change in monthly production, August 1946-August 1947 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Monthly Bulletin, July-August 1947, p.182. Notes: 
*Monthly data was only available for August in this context for comparing industry data 
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The National Bank of Hungary’s Monthly Bulletin explains the data from 
Chart 14 in terms of percentage of each good since 1938. In order to analyze 
more simply, we turned these numbers into a chart. From Chart 15, the 
industries that recovered the most, and even surpassed 1938 production 
levels, were mineral oil (1497 percent), manganese ore (192 percent), 
aluminum (247 percent), flax and hemp fabrics (123 percent), glass (86 
percent), and coal (83 percent). Chart 16 goes further and explores the 
difference in monthly production just for the month of August in 1946 and 
1947. All sectors increased production between these months, except for 
mineral oil production. 
Charts 15 and 16 omit agricultural production. Agricultural production 
was measured by consumption levels and quantities supplied to the 
market. The Monthly Bulletin noted that during the first year of the forint, 
the supply of food increased, while actual consumption of food items was 
below the quantity supplied. From estimated consumption of food, meat 
and fat consumption increased, while potato consumption decreased. Data 
collected on the quantity of food brought to the Main Market and the 
market halls of Budapest indicate that the total amount of wagons 
increased by 140 percentfrom 1945/1946 to 1946/1947. This amount, 
however, was only 36 percentof 1938/1939 levels. Table 2 shows the 
monthly amount of wagons brought to the market (Hungarian Monthly 
Bulletin, July-August 1947). 
 
Table 2. Food wagons 
 1938/1939 1945/1946 1946/1947 
Total of the year 28,555 4,250 10,183 
August 4,367 322 476 
September 3,944 298 356 
October 3,198 409 170 
November 2,397 137 108 
December 1,809 422 551 
January 1,287 152 154 
February 1,256 149 102 
March 1,420 416 853 
April 1,530 585 916 
May 1,759 984 1,135 
June 2,723 151 1,894 
July 2,865 225 3,468 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, Monthly Bulletin, no. 7-8, July-August 1947, p. 183 
 
To get an idea of whether hyperinflation helped, hurt, or was largely 
neutral for production, let us compare Hungary to other countries that also 
experienced devastation from WWII. We will compare Hungary to 
Germany, because it was the main Axis power and suffered heavy losses; 
the other Axis countries in Europe; and some neighboring countries. Data 
come from the Maddison Project of GDP per capita, although data were not 
available for all years for all countries. Table 3 consists of calculations 
constructed from GDP per capita over different time periods, annualized to 
compare different countries’ recoveries. 
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Table 3. Annual-ized change in GDP per person (%) 
 Hungary Germany Romania Yugoslavia Bulgaria Italy Greece 
1938-1944  3.35   -2.24 -7.29 -13.57 
1938-1945  -1.43   -4.67 -7.75 -13.92 
1938-1946 -5.28 -9.65    -3.31 -7.90 
1938-1948 -1.86 -5.51 -4.11 1.33  -0.30 -3.90 
Source: Calculations from Maddison Project database (2013). 
 
From1938-1948, annualized change in GDP per capita was better in 
Hungary than in Germany, Greece, or Romania. I chose 1948 as the 
endpoint because it was a few years after WWII, giving the affected 
countries time to recover. However, both Yugoslavia and Italy performed 
better than Hungary in the period. The other data available for Hungary 
allowed for a comparison between 1946 (rather than 1948) and 1938. The 
annualized change in GDP per capita for Hungary between 1938 and 1946 
was once again higher than in Germany and Greece, but lower thanin Italy.  
In summary, Hungary was in the middle of the pack. To say more 
would require more detailed structural investigation of the economies 
mentioned, which I did not do in light of the time constraints for this paper. 
It does seem that Hungary’s hyperinflation did not greatly hurt the speed 
of the recovery after WWII. In fact, production across major industrial and 
agricultural sectors increased post WWII up to 1947. 
As currency stabilization came closer, involvement by foreign powers 
increased. The Soviet Union helped through readjusting Hungary’s 
reparation schedule and the United States purchased American surplus 
property as a way to give a line of credit worth $15 million to Hungary, as 
well as supporting Hungary for aUnited Nations Relief and Recovery 
Agency (UNRRA) program. The Soviet Union increased the repayment 
timeline for its loan from six to eight years, reduced late penalties, and 
reduced the amount of deliveries due in 1946 and 1947 (Ecker-Racz, 1946). 
With the extra help, Hungary was able to focus on stabilization efforts. In 
order to prepare for stabilization, Hungary began to hold merchandise and 
finished product, so that there would be goods to buy once the forint was 
issued (Ecker-Racz, 1946; Vas & Gonda, 1977). 
 
6. Conclusion 
From data on production across sectors, it is evident that Hungary’s 
economy, despite hyperinflation, was able to recover from WWII. By 1948, 
GDP per capita was 83 percentof pre-war levels (Madison Project, 2013). 
Industries such as coal and railways had recovered to approximately 
similar levels. Comparisons of GDP per capita to nearby countries shows 
that Hungary seemingly had a better recovery than many. This, however, 
does not allow us to determine the extent to which hyperinflation affected 
their economy. As explained earlier, hyperinflation allowed payments on 
loans given out from the government to decrease in value, which may have 
encouraged production. Further, hyperinflation may have served as a 
demand shock to the economy, and along with other policies enacted by 
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the government, did not appear to hurt the economy as much as expected. 
In order to make this assertion, however, more data and analysis would 
need to be completed. Industrial production in other countries would serve 
as a good starting point for comparison.  
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Appendix 
This section explain charts that were manipulated or required further calculations or 
omissions of original data. Unless otherwise indicated, no additional calculations were 
made. Tabs refer to the accompanying spreadsheet. 
Chart 1 – “Other” category is a sum of handicrafts, commerce, finance and insurance, 
private households, cultural institutions, and others. This was done because national wealth 
for chart 1 was only given as a lump sum for all. Therefore, in order to find the war losses 
and their percent of national wealth, the categories were added for similar comparisons. The 
separate categories and their totals can be found on the accompanying spreadsheet under 
Tab 9. 
Chart 2 –Tab 9.  
Chart 3 –Tab 9. 
Chart 4 – Tab 3. 
Chart 5–Tab 9. 
Chart 6–Tab 9. 
Chart 7– Data on a log scale for chart. Chart 7 can be found under Tab 6. 
Chart 8 – Data on a log scale for chart. Chart 8 can be found under Tab 7. Correlation 
function was used between both rows of data to find correlation. 
Chart 9 – Reduction calculations are next to data, to find how much production of each 
mineral changed. Other than that, no further calculations or manipulations were performed. 
Chart 9 can be found under Tab 7 of accompanying spreadsheet.  
Chart 10 – Numbers were manipulated to make data continuous and all indexed 
numbers on the same level. Exact manipulations are next to the columns that needed 
calculations on the spreadsheet. The data was not continuous because the high numbers of 
inflation led to new indexations of 1945 levels. For example, when numbers started to get 
high, the index would make 1945 equal 1 instead of 100. Simple multiplication was used to 
account for the discrepancy. The chart was also made on a log scale. Calculations for 
inflation numbers are beside the actual data. This was done through division of index of 
living, and then computing annual and monthly data. Further correlation numbers were 
calculated through the correlation function. Chart 10 can be found on Tab 10. 
Charts 11a and 11b – Numbers were combined from two different sources that gave the 
same numbers. These sources are The Hungarian Central Creditbank and The South African 
Journal of Economics. Two separate charts were made for note circulation and the real value 
of the currency, since the two could not be superimposed. The two could not be 
superimposed because data on the real value of the currency was of a lesser frequency. Both 
have accompanying tables and can be found on Tab 11. 
Chart 12 –Tab 11. 
Chart 13– Tab 12. 
Chart 14– Tab 15. 
Chart 15 – Calculations were made by dividing 1946/1947 levels by 1938 levels to find 
the percent of 1938 levels. Chart 15 can be found on Tab 15. 
Chart 16 – Calculations were made by finding the percent change in monthly production 
between August 1946 and August 1947. Chart 16 can be found on Tab 15.  
Table 1a and 1b–For Table 1a, there were no additional calculations. Table 1a can be 
found on Tab 16. For Table 1b, only information on damaged or destroyed railways and 
their 1938 levels were used. Further, only a couple examples of capital were used because 
complete data was not available for all railway capital. Table 1b can be found on Tab 10. 
Table 2 – No additional calculations for Table 2, which can be found on Tab 15. 
However, percent reductions for monthly data were calculated next to Table 2 for reference. 
Table 3 – Table 3 was constructed from Maddison Project data on GDP per capita. First, 
percentage changes from different time periods of GDP per capita were calculated. Then, 
those data were annualized to compare rates across countries. Data wereomitted from the 
table if they were too spotty. The final Table 3 is in blue on Tab 14.  
The following source was used to identify large numbers and the amount of zeros they 
carry via both the English and U.S. systems: "Names of Large Numbers." Wikipedia. 
Wikimedia Foundation, 16 July 2015. Web. 27 July 2015. [Retrieved from]. 
Journal of Economics Library 
V. Kumar, JEL, 7(1), 2020, p.54-68. 
68 
68 
References 
Ecker-Racz, L.L. (1946). Hungarian economic developments January 1945–June 1946. 
Unpublished manuscript. U.S. Legation, Budapest.  
Ecker-Racz, L.L. (1954). The Hungarian Economy, 1920-1954. Council for Economic and 
Industrial Research, Inc., p.12.  
Ecker-Racz, L.L. (1946). The Hungarian currency stabilization, Memo, Budapest, p.7.  
Encyclopedia of Money.(2015). Hungarian post–World War II hyperinflation. Encyclopedia of 
Money, [Retrieved from].  
Exchange Currency. (2015). Hungarian Forint. [Retrieved from].  
Grossman, P.Z., & Horv{th, J. (2000). The dynamics of the Hungarian hyperinflation, 1945-6: 
A new perspective Scholarship and Professional Work - Business. Paper No.29. [Retrieved 
from]. 
Hanke, S.H., & Krus, N. (2012). World hyperinflation. Cato Institute Working Papers Cato 
Institute. [Retrieved from].  
Hoensch, J. (2015). A History of Modern Hungary: 1867-1994. Trans. Kim Traynor. 2nd ed. 
London: Longman.  
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, (2019). Cited as the source for. [Retrieved from].  
Hungarian Central Creditbank, (1946). Appendix I, (GK 324.4, M27s). Print. 
Maddison Project Database, (2013). [Retrieved from].  
Makinen, G.E. (2014). Studies in Hyperinflation and Stabilization. New York: Center for 
Financial Stability.  
National Bank of Hungary (1947). Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Hungary in Statistical Tables. 
Budapest: National Bank of Hungary, No.9781.  
National Bank of Hungary (1945). Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Monthly Bulletin of the National Bank 
of Hungary, No.7-12, pp.15-47. Hungarian Monthly Bulletin, No.1-6, Jan.-June 1946. 
Hungarian Monthly Bulletin, No. 7-8, July-Aug. 1947. pp.182-183. Budapest.  
Siklos, P.L. (1989). The end of the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-1946. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 21(2), 135-47. doi. 10.2307/1992364 
Siklos, P. (1991). War Finance, Reconstruction, Hyperinflation, and Stabilization in Hungary, 
1938-1948. New York: St. Martin’s Press.  
Stowe, L. (2015). Hungary's agrarian revolution. Foreign Affairs. 11 Oct. [Retrieved from].  
Vas, Z., & Gonda, L. (1977). 30 Eves a Forint [30 Years of the Forint]. Budapest. 
Winkle, F.F. (1947). Inflation and stabilization of Hungarian currency. South African Journal of 
Economics, 15(3), 183-184. doi. 10.1111/j.1813-6982.1947.tb01502.x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
